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to avoid this problem by obtaining a knowledgeable waiver at the outset
so that review of the record for conflict does not become necessary.
Lastly, the Olsen approach avoids the problem of knowledgeable waiver
of rights respecting separate counsel that can arise if a defendant waives
these rights without fully appreciating the significance of potential conflicts."' By providing the supreme court with a trial record replete with
all waiver discussion, review of the waiver is possible.
The adoption of the affirmative-inquiry standard by the Minnesota
court in Olsen properly transfers from the defense counsel to the trial
court the responsibility of protecting the untrained and oftentimes uninformed defendant's right to effective counsel. By adopting this standard, the Minnesota court has stepped into the forefront of this important area. The Minnesota criminal defendant's sixth amendment right
to effective counsel is now better protected from the perils of joint representation.

Election Law-MINNESOTA BALLOT POSITION STATUTE DOES NOT VIOLATE
EQUAL PROTECTION-Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
The arrangement of candidates' names on election ballots has traditionally been the prerogative of state legislatures.' In recent years, howreferences to one defendant may be made in order to promote the image of the other
defendant before the jury, or counsel may decide to allow only one defendant to testify,
leaving a question in the mind of the jury as to why the nontestifying codefendant did
not take the stand. Moreover, counsel may fail to object to certain damaging evidence
because it is favorable to one defendant, or he may unknowingly emphasize one defendant's case to the detriment of the other's defense. Furthermore, different mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and varying degrees of involvement in the crime may lead
counsel to play one defendant against the other.
50. See Campbell v. United States, 352 F.2d 359, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1965) ("An individual
defendant is rarely sophisticated enough to evaluate the potential conflicts ....
");
United States v. Garafola, 428 F. Supp. 620, 623 (D.N.J. 1977) (average defendant unable
to understand fully the effect joint representation may have on trial strategy). See
generally Geer, supra note 3, at 140-42. The jointly represented defendant is not in a
position to evaluate whether his rights will be protected adequately by a single counsel.
For example, a "strong" defendant may thrust his own attorney upon a "weak" codefendant who will accept the joint representation without realizing that he is entitled to the
undivided loyalty of counsel to his own cause. Furthermore, it is virtually impossible for
a defendant to envision, before trial, the myriad circumstances under which a conflict may
arise, because conflicts are at times unforeseeable and often develop during the course of
trial. In addition, defendants usually consent to a waiver in reliance on advice received
from counsel who has represented that no conflicts exist.
1. E.g., Mann v. Powell, 333 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. I1. 1971); see, e.g., Voltaggio
v. Caputo, 210 F. Supp. 337, 338-39 (D.N.J. 1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 232 (1963).
The methods of determining ballot position include:
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ever, ballot placement has been a matter of controversy involving constitutional issues.' The controversy surrounding ballot placement derives from a phenomenon called "positional bias."' Political scientists
have asserted that in any election 4 the first position on the ballot is
advantageous to the candidate whose name appears there.' The candi(1) alphabetical arrangement according to surname, see, e.g., FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 101.141(4) (West Supp. 1978) (primary elections); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
20-3-20, 20-7-5 (1969); id. § 20-12-1 (Supp. 1977);
(2) lottery, see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:14-12 (West Supp. 1978); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2875 (Purdon 1978) (primary elections); id. § 2962(b)
(Purdon Supp. 1978) (same); TEx. EL.c. CODE ANN. art. 13.17 (Vernon Supp.
1978) (same); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.60(1)(b) (West Supp. 1978), as amended by
Act of July 8, 1978, ch. 449, § 5, 1977-1978 Wis. Legis. Serv. 2562 (West); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 5.60(1)(c), (5)(a), (6), (8) (West Supp. 1978); id. § 5.62(4)(b) (West
Supp. 1978), as amended by Act of June 5, 1978, ch. 427, § 36, 1977-1978 Wis.
Legis. Serv. 2458 (West) (spring elections and primaries);
(3) party receiving highest number of votes in last election, see, e.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 101.151(4) (West Supp. 1978) (last gubernatorial contest determines order in general elections); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.64(1)(b) (1967) (same);
(4) incumbents first, see, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 53, § 34 (West 1975
& Supp. 1978), as amended by Act of July 12, 1978, ch. 393, § 27, 1978 Mass.
Legis. Serv. 375 (West); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 42 (West 1975 & Supp.
1978), as amended by Act of May 5, 1978, ch. 136, 1978 Mass. Legis. Serv. 111
(West);
(5) discretion of the board of elections, see, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §
16-3 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978);
(6) rotation of names, see, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 43.28, 49.31 (West Supp.
1978) (rotation of names among but not within precincts); MINN. STAT. §§
203A.23(5), .35(1) (1976) (primary and nonpartisan general elections); and
(7) party receiving smallest number of votes in last election, see, e.g., MINN.
STAT.

§ 203A.33(4) (1976).

2. See, e.g., Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1977) (intentional discrimination in name placement constituted violation of equal protection), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
939 (1978); Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1976) (statute providing that
incumbents be listed first on ballot found to have rational basis and therefore not violative
of equal protection); Kautenburger v. Jackson, 85 Ariz. 128, 333 P.2d 293 (1958) (equal
protection requires rotation of names in voting machines when rotation on paper ballot is
required by statute); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1975) (practice of listing incumbents first on ballot is not warranted by any compelling
government interest and therefore violative of equal protection).
3. See H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, BALLOT POSITION AND VoTER's CHOICE (1957); Masterman,
The Effect of the "Donkey Vote" on the House of Representatives, 10 AUSTL. J. OF POL. &
HisT. 221 (1964); Upton & Brook, The Importance of Positional Voting Bias in British
Elections, 22 PoLmcAL STUD. 178 (1974); Note, California Ballot Position Statutes: An
UnconstitutionalAdvantage to Incumbents, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 365 (1972); Comment,
Equal Protection in Ballot Positioning,28 U. FLA. L. REv. 816 (1976).
4. In Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978),
the court recognized the opinion of experts at trial that positional bias has a greater effect
in nonpartisan elections than in partisan elections.
5. See Mueller, Choosing Among 133 Candidates, 34 Pus. OPINION Q. 395, 399 (1970);
Upton & Brook, supra note 3, at 189. But cf. Mueller, Voting on the Propositions:Ballot
Patternsand Historical Trends in California,63 AM. POLITICAL Sci. REV. 1197, 1208 (1969)
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date whose name appears in the first position is expected to receive a
number of "extra" votes merely because of the position of his or her
name on the ballot. 6 These extra votes7 confer an advantage not available to candidates whose names are listed after the first position." To
counteract the advantage created by positional bias, some statutes provide for rotation of names on the ballot so that each candidate's name
appears in the first position on an equal number of ballots in an election.9
(the tendency to vote for the candidate in the first position reverses itself towards the end
of a lengthy ballot). See generally H. BAIN & D. HECOCK, supra note 3; Comment, supra
note 3, at 819-32.
The location of the first position may vary according to how the ballot is arranged; it
may he either the top row or the far left column. See, e.g., Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp.
1057, 1065 (D. Mass. 1976); MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(4) (1976).
6. The advantage, a number of extra votes, conferred by the first ballot position changes
depending on other variables of a particular election. Among the variables are the publicity given the election, the level of office, the total number of candidates for the office, and
the placement of the race among other races on the ballot. See, e.g., Tsongas v. Secretary
of the Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 708, 710-11, 291 N.E.2d 149, 151 (1972).
7. Courts have used the terms "extra" votes, Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 416
(Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978), "donkey" votes, Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp.
1057, 1063 (D. Mass. 1976), and "windfall" votes. Id.
8. The number of extra votes has been estimated to be a minimum of five percent of
the candidate's total votes. See Note, supra note 3, at 376. But see J. Tomlinson & K.
Broady, The Effect of Ballot Position in Partisan Elections (Jan. 10, 1977 release) (unpublished study of three city elections in Minnesota in 1973, 1974, and 1975) (on file at
William Mitchell Law Review office).
Arguably, positional bias could influence the outcome of a close election. Numerous
other factors, however, affect voter behavior and they cannot be isolated in an election
study. Party affiliation is the most important factor influencing voter behavior in a partisan election. See, e.g., Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 414-15 (Minn.), cert. denied,
436 U.S. 927 (1978). But election visibility, sex, ethnic background, and age are also
important factors. Thus, the impact of positional bias is difficult to measure accurately.
See generally W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, PoLrrcAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN
ELECTORATE

69-90 (3d ed. 1975).

9. See, e.g., Ajuz. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 16-533 (1975) (primary elections); id. § 16-796
(primary elections and voting machines); IOWA CODE ANN. § 43.28 (West Supp. 1978)
(primary elections); id. § 49.31(2)-(3) (rotation in elections where two or more persons are
to be elected at large and in city, school, and special elections); id. § 52.10 (West 1973)
(voting machines); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-610 (Supp. 1977) (rotation on ballots); id. § 251318 (1973) (rotation on voting machines, positions determined by lot when insufficient
number of machines prohibits rotation); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-426 (1974) (general election); id. § 32-528 (Supp. 1976) (primary election); OHIO CONsT. art. V, § 2a (general
election); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.04, .10 (Page Supp. 1977) (presidential and
nonpartisan general elections); Act of Mar. 10, 1978, file 216, § 1, 1978 Ohio Legis. Bull.
71 (Anderson) (to be codified as OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3505.03) (other general elections).
In State v. Board of Comm'rs, 39 Ohio St. 2d 130, 314 N.E.2d 172 (1974) the court
reviewed the problem that, with the introduction of voting machines, rotation of names
could not be provided in the same way as with paper ballots. Sustaining a challenge to
the failure of voting machines to rotate names within a precinct, the Ohio Supreme Court
declared that a system of "[plerfect rotation" would require that "every name will be
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Minnesota law requires the rotation of names in nonpartisan elections."' However, in partisan elections where the candidate's party designation appears on the ballot a different method of name placement is
required." The first position on the ballot is allocated to the political
seen by an equal number of voters at the beginning, at the end, and in each intermediate
place, if any, of the group in which such name belongs." Id. at 134 n.2, 314 N.E.2d at 176
n.2. Recognizing that voting machines currently marketed do not have the capacity to
rotate names, id. at 136 n.4, 314 N.E.2d at 177 n.4, the court held that each precinct must
have at least two voting machines and always an even number of machines, that names
of candidates be rotated alternately within a precinct, that voters be directed to use the
machines in serial sequence, and that names of candidates for office in which three or more
candidates are running be rotated not only within a precinct from machine to machine
but also continuously from one precinct to the next. Id. at 143, 314 N.E.2d at 181. The
court also held that the Ohio Constitution did not demand perfect rotation to meet the
constitutional requirement. Id. The constitution states in part:
The names of all candidates for an office at any general election shall be
arranged in a group under the title of that office, and shall be so alternated that
each name shall appear (in so far as may be reasonably possible) substantially
an equal number of times at the beginning, at the end, and in each intermediate
place, if any, of the group in which such name belongs.
OHIO CONST. art. V, § 2a.
Prior to 1972, Wisconsin required the rotation of candidates' names on ballots for spring
elections and primary elections. See Act of Sept. 24, 1966, ch. 666, §§ 1, 2, 1965-1966 Wis.
Laws 1217 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.60(1)(b)(2) (1967)) (spring election ballots);
Act of Sept. 24, 1966, ch. 666, §§ 1, 2, 1965-1966 Wis. Laws 1217 (codified at Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 5.60(1)(b)(2) (1967)) (spring election ballots); Act of Sept. 24, 1966, ch. 666, § 1,
2, 1965-1966 Wis. Laws 1217 (codified at Wis. STAT. ANN. - 5.62(4)(b) (1967)) (September primary ballots). In 1972 this requirement was repealed by the Legislature and replaced by the requirement that ballot position be determined by drawing lots. See Act of
May 8, 1972, ch. 304, §§ 9-10, 1971 Wis. Laws 1217 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. §
5.60(1)(b) (West Supp. 1978)) (spring election ballots); Act of May 8, 1972, ch. 304, § 12,
1971 Wis. Laws 1218 (current version at Wis. STAT. ANN. § 5.62(4)(b) (West Supp. 1978))
(September primary ballots).
10. See MINN. STAT. § 203A.35(1) (1976). Since 1959 Minnesota has provided for ballot
rotation in primary elections and nonpartisan general elections. See Act of Apr. 24, 1959,
ch. 675, art. 4, §§ 34(1), 35(5), 1959 Minn. Laws 1158.
11. See MINN. STAT, § 203A.33(2), (4) (1976). Subdivision 2 provides:
At the general election, and in the case of partisan offices only, the names of
candidates nominated by petition shall follow those of candidates nominated at
primaries in the order in which the petitions are filed.
Id. § 203A.33(2). Subdivision 4 provides:
At the general election, and in the case of partisan offices only, the first name
printed for each office, or group of names if more than one is to be voted for, for
the same office, shall be that of the candidate of the political party which at
the last preceding general election polled the smallest number of votes, the same
to be determined by the average vote cast for that party's candidates for partisan offices except representatives in congress. In like manner the second and
succeeding lines shall be filled with the names of the candidates of the other
political parties receiving succeedingly higher numbers of votes respectively. For
the purposes of this subdivision, the average vote of the party shall be computed
by determining the total number of votes counted in the state for all of the
party's candidates on the general election ballot except representatives in congress, and dividing that sum by the number of the party's candidates, except
representatives in congress, appearing on the general election ballot.
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party that received the smallest number of votes in the last general
election 2 provided that the party meets certain requirements. First, a
political party's candidates must be nominated by primary, and second,
at least one of its candidates must receive a threshold percentage of
votes in the last general election. 3 Therefore, along with independent
candidates, candidates from minor political parties failing to receive the
requisite number of votes in prior elections cannot possibly attain the
first position on the ballot in any political contest.
In Ulland v. Growe"4 the Minnesota Supreme Court confronted the
On voting machines, "first name printed for each office" means the position
nearest the top or farthest left, whichever applies.
Id. § 203A.33(4).
12. Id.
13. See id. §§ 202A.41(3), 203A.33(2). Eligibility for placement in the first position on
the ballot involves two qualifications. One is affiliation with a political organization that
qualifies as a "political party" within the meaning of the election statute. Id. § 203A.33(4).
MINN. STAT. § 200.02(7) (1976) sets forth the requirements for qualifying as a political
party:
The words "political party" mean an organization which shall have maintained
in the state, governmental subdivision thereof or precinct therein in question, a
party organization and presented candidates for election at the last preceding
general election one or more of which candidates shall have been voted for in
each county within the state at such election and shall have received in the state
not less than five percent of the total vote cast for all candidates at such election
or whose members to a number equal to at least five percent of the total number
of votes cast at the preceding general election in the county where the application is made shall present to the county auditor a petition for a place on the
primary election ballot.
The other qualification is that the candidate be nominated in the primary election. Id. §
203A.33(2).
Another statute, however, contains criteria that, theoretically, can disqualify candidates from being eligible for first place on the ballot in the general election even though
they received the majority of votes cast for their political parties in the primary. MINN.
STAT. § 202A.41(3) (1976) provides:
If at the primary election any person seeking a party's nomination for an office
receives a number of votes equal to ten percent of the average votes cast at the
last general election for state officers of that political party within the district
for which the office is voted, then all candidates of that political party who
receive the highest vote for an office are the nominees of that political party. If
none of the candidates of a political party receive the required ten percent, then
no candidates are nominated, and all the candidates of that political party may
be nominated, by nominating petitions as provided in sections 202A.27 to
202A.31. The term "state officers," as used in this section for the purpose of
computing the average vote to determine the ten percent as provided in this
section, means the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, and attorney general.
The relationship of this statute to ballot placement requirements is unclear as presently
applied. Strictly read, the statute suggests that under some circumstances a candidate
nominated by primary and belonging to a "political party" might nevertheless fail to
qualify for first ballot position.
14. 262 N.W.2d 412 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
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issue of whether the failure to provide equal access to the first position
on a ballot and, as a result, equal access to the benefits of positional bias
was a violation of the equal protection clause.' 5 The plaintiff, an independent candidate for the state legislature,"' asserted that the statute
created two classes of candidates for partisan elections: those qualified
to appear on the ballot because of winning a primary election 7 and those
qualified to appear by filing a nominating petition."' In so doing, he
claimed that the law had created an unreasonable classification denying
him equal protection. As an independent candidate qualifying by petition,' 9 the plaintiff would never be eligible to have his name appear in
the first position on the ballot.2
The threshold inquiry in Ulland was whether the rational basis standard or the strict scrutiny standard of review should be applied in determining the constitutionality of the challenged election statute.2' Courts
have recognized that states have broad power over the mechanics of the
electoral process." Therefore, only when the statute in question infringes
upon a fundamental right is the strict scrutiny standard of review applied. ' Under this standard, the state must establish the existence of a
15. See U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1. The names of candidates nominated by petition
are placed after the names of candidates nominated in primaries. MINN. STAT. §
203A.33(2) (1976). Candidates nominated by petition are listed in the order in which their
petitions are filed. Id.
16. Originally, the Independent-Republican Party and several of its candidates joined
with the independent candidate to assert a denial of equal protection because the statute
gave first ballot position to the party polling the largest number of votes in the last
election. See Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 413 n.1 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
927 (1978). The number of votes excluded votes for congressional partisan offices. See Act
of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. 4, § 33(3), 1959 Minn. Laws 1158. During the litigation a
statutory amendment satisfied the Independent-Republican Party candidates' claim that
the statute would systematically grant first position to the Democratic-Farmer-Labor
Party candidates in every partisan election. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d at 413 n.1, 414
n.4. The amendment designated the first ballot position to the candidate whose party
polled the smallest number of votes among recognized political parties. See Act of Apr.
9, 1976, ch. 224, § 3, 1976 Minn. Laws 828 (amending MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(4) (Supp.
1975)).
17. See MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(3) (1976). Candidates who are affiliated with a political
party and are unopposed will still be listed on the primary election ballot and, therefore,
be nominated by primary election. See id. § 203A.22.
18. See id. § 203A.33(2).
19. See id.
20. See id. § 203A.33(2), (4).
21. 262 N.W.2d at 415; see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968). For a discussion of the equal protection clause, see Note, Notice of Claim Requirement Under the
Minnesota Municipal Tort Liability Act, 4 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 93, 109-16 (1978). For
an analysis of evolving equal protection standards, see Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection,86 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1972).
22. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1972); McDonald v. Board of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
23. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 & n.3 (1976)
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compelling government interest to infringe upon the fundamental
right.2 If a fundamental right is not involved, a less rigorous standard
of review-the rational basis standard-is applied." In applying the
rational basis standard, the court presumes a statute to be valid so long
as the statute is reasonably related" to a legitimate object of the legisla-

tion . 27

(per curiam). Activities recognized as fundamental rights include rights of a uniquely
private nature, the right to vote, the right to interstate travel, rights guaranteed by the
first amendment, and the right to procreate. Id.
Another factor can trigger strict scrutiny of a statute when it operates to the disadvantage of a recognized "suspect" class. See, e.g., id. at 312-13 (mandatory retirement involves neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (school financing system not discriminatory against a suspect
class). A suspect class is one encumbered with disabilities, historically subject to
unequal treatment, or handicapped by political powerlessness. Id. at 28; Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964)
(race).
24. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (statute denying aliens permission
to practice law subjected to strict scrutiny held unconstitutional). The governmental
interest must be "overriding." Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Not only must the government have a substantial interest, but the use of the
classification must be "necessary ...
to the accomplishment" of the interest. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964).
25. See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977)
(unemployment compensation statute); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam) (mandatory retirement); O'Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S.
524 (1974) (voting rights of convicted misdemeanants and pretrail detainees); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (no rational basis for law giving preference to men over women
in appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 485-86 (1970); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 808-10 (1969)
(regulations that prevent inmates awaiting sentencing from qualifying for absentee ballots
are rationally related to legitimate state purpose of maintaining prison discipline); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-90 (1955) (statute prohibiting
opticians from replacing eyeglasses without prescription rationally related to public health
and welfare). For a description of the rational basis standard, see Comment, Equal Protection in Transition:An Analysis and a Proposal,41 FORDHAM L. REv. 605, 606-07, 609-10
(1973).
26. See, e.g., Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 538-40 (1975) (per curiam) (automatic
dismissal of pending appeals for felons who escape reasonably related to objective of
deterring escapes). In Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), the Court stated:
"[Liegislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve
permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class
subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have 'some relevance to the purpose
for which the classification is made.'" Id. at 309; accord, F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); State v. Reps, 302 Minn. 38, 49, 223 N.W.2d 780, 787
(1974); Schwartz v. Talmo, 295 Minn. 356, 362, 205 N.W.2d 318, 322, appeal dismissed,
414 U.S. 803 (1973).
27. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (election law denying political party access to ballot adversely affected voting rights); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
10-11 (1967) (antimiscegenation statute violated equal protection); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966) (poll tax discriminated against less affluent
voters); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (mandatory
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In determining the standard to be applied, courts have distinguished
between election statutes that interfere with the exercise of the political
franchise, that is, with the right to vote, 2' and statutes regulating the
right to appear on the ballot as a candidate for political office. " The
latter is usually subject to the rational basis standard of review, '0
whereas the former is subject to the strict scrutiny standard. ' , On this
basis, statutes affecting the right to run for political office are subject
to the strict scrutiny standard to the extent that the restrictions on the
candidates are found to infringe upon the right to vote.2 For example,
the United States Supreme Court has declared the following to be an
unconstitutional infringement on voting rights: statutes imposing an
unreasonable filing fee system for candidates in a primary election " and
sterilization of certain felons held discriminatory); cf. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto
Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359-60 (1973) (ad valorem personal property tax assessed against
corporations and not individuals held valid); State v. Friswold, 263 Minn. 130, 134, 116
N.W.2d 270, 274 (1973) (temporary procedural preference afforded to violators of traffic
ordinances, but not violators of traffic statutes, held not unreasonably discriminatory).
28. The political franchise is a fundamental right which, if infringed, will subject the
infringing regulation to the strict scrutiny standard of review. See Bullock v. Carter, 405
U.S. 134, 142-44 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968); Ulland v. Growe,
262 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978); Meyers v. Roberts, 310
Minn. 358, 360-61, 246 N.W.2d 186, 187-88 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977).
Implicit in the right to vote is the right of voters to "cast their votes effectively."
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30. See note 43 infra and accompanying text.
29. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 715-16 (1974) (reasonable standards can
be imposed to limit access to the ballot); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972)
(candidate status not sufficiently fundamental to require strict review); Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968) (restricted access to placement on ballot cannot be
permitted to interfere with the right to vote); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 7 (1944)
(right to run for office is not a constitutionally protected right of liberty or property);
Belier v. Kirk, 328 F. Supp. 485, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1970) (per curiam) (signatures of three
percent of voters in state can be required to have name of candidate placed on ballot),
aff'd sub nom. Belier v. Askew, 403 U.S. 925 (1971); Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592,
595 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (candidate filing fees are not invidiously discriminatory), appeal
dismissed, 400 U.S. 986 (1971).
30. But cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31, 34 (1968) (strict scrutiny standard
of review applied to ballot laws which were so restrictive as to impair the right to vote).
31. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143-44 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
32. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31
(1968); see Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974). Outside the area of voting rights,
the Court has indicated that the rational basis standard may apply to a regulation involving a fundamental right if the regulation does not significantly interfere with the right.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (state regulation of marriage is not
subject to strict scrutiny unless the regulation interferes with the decision to marry);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977) (refusal to finance indigent women's abortions
does not unduly interfere with freedom to decide to terminate pregnancy).
33. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
149 (1972). The statutes in Bullock effectively eliminated all candidates not privately
wealthy or affiliated with a well-financed, organized party. Id. at 143.
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statutes imposing burdensome procedures for filing nominating petitions. 3' Although courts have recognized the phenomenon of positional
bias in cases involving nonpartisan or primary elections,u they have
split on the question of whether positional bias infringes on the right to
vote. :6
Holding that no fundamental right had been infringed, the Minnesota
court in Ulland applied the rational basis standard of review to the
statute. The court found a reasonable basis in the Legislature's intent
to assist party- affiliated voters in quickly and easily locating their
candidates' names on the ballot. 7 Evidence introduced at trial established that two-thirds of Minnesota voters identify with one of the
major political parties. Therefore, assisting the majority of voters supplied a rational basis for the classification of party-affiliated and unaffiliated candidates.3 The court concluded that even if ballot rotation
39
were marginally fairer, it would not overturn the statute.
In rejecting the strict scrutiny standard, the court found no significant
impact on voting rights. 0 Proponents of ballot rotation analogize positional bias to improper apportionment. They have argued that because
the candidate in the first position on the ballot receives a number of
extra votes, the votes for candidates on other ballot positions are, in
effect, unconstitutionally "diluted."'" The Minnesota court rejected this
argument, finding that the dilution which occurs because of positional
bias is not the same as the dilution caused by improper apportionment."
34. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33-34 (1968).
35. See, e.g., Weisberg v. Powell, 417 F.2d 388 (7th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (primary
election); Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975)
(nonpartisan); Elliott v. Secretary of State, 295 Mich. 245, 294 N.W. 171 (1940) (per
curiam) (nonpartisan); Holtzman v. Power, 62 Misc. 2d 1020, 313 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct.),
affl'd, 27 N.Y.2d 628, 261 N.E.2d 666, 313 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1970) (primary election).
36. Compare Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975)
with Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1976). In Gould, the court held that
the ballot position provision of the statute imposed a significant impact on the "equality,
fairness and integrity of the electoral process." 14 Cal. 3d at 670, 536 P.2d at 1343, 122
Cal. Rptr. at 383.
37. See 262 N.W.2d at 418; cf. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144-45 (1972) (state has
a legitimate interest in keeping ballots within manageable, understandable limits). The
Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the interest of the voter in being able to identify
readily the candidates for whom he wishes to vote. See Bradley v. Lunding, 63 Il.2d 91,
98, 344 N.E.2d 472, 476, stay denied, 424 U.S. 1309 (Stevens, Circuit Justice), appeal
dismissed, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
38. 262 N.W.2d at 418.
39. Id. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has stated that the propriety of the
Legislature's failure to counteract the positional bias factor in favor of a uniform system
of assigning ballot position "turn[s] on matters of degree." Tsongas v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 708, 720, 291 N.E.2d 149, 156 (1972).
40. 262 N.W.2d at 416; accord, Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass.
1976).
41. See, e.g., Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 536 P.2d 1337, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1975).
42. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
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Improper apportionment occurs when districts with unequal populations nevertheless have the same number of legislators elected from each
district. Consequently, the improper apportionment dilutes the impact
of votes cast in the underrepresented districts." Positional bias, on the
other hand, occurs because some voters, having no reason to vote for any
particular candidate, automatically cast their votes for the candidate
listed first on the ballot. This uninformed choice makes the first position
on the ballot superior to all others.
The court did not recognize a constitutional right to be free from the
effects of positional bias. Treating uninformed voters differently would
be equivalent to recognizing a constitutional right to a wholly rational
election based only on reasoned considerations of issues and candidates'
opinions." At least one court, prior to the Minnesota decision, had rejected an attack on an election statute for this reason, stating: "Voters
have no constitutional right to a wholly rational election, based solely
on reasoned consideration of the issues and the candidates' positions,
and free from [such] other 'irrational' considerations as a candidate's
ethnic affiliation, sex, or home town.""4
Whether the court will continue to apply a rational basis standard to
the issue of positional bias depends on the evidence that can be presented to support the existence and impact of positional bias.4" Research
The Minnesota Supreme Court did not make reference to dictum in Clough v. Guzzi, 416
F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass. 1976), that suggested one other distinction from the reap-

portionment cases. The federal district court had noted that candidates and their supporters can minimize the number of uninformed voters through their campaign efforts to make
the election visible and thus inform the electorate. What that discussion seems to infer is
the unprecedented requirement that when the effects of the disadvantage caused by a
statute can be overcome the strict scrutiny standard need not be applied. The court's
language could be interpreted, however, as an emphasis on the lack of evidence that the
election statute directly caused dilution to the extent that it infringed the fundamental
right to vote.
43. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978);
see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In reapportionment cases the United States Supreme Court
has held that a maximum total deviation of up to 10% from mathematically perfect
representation is insufficient, absent other factors, to constitute an equal protection violation. See White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 776-77 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part,
concurring in part) (total deviation was 9.9%); cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
737 (1973) (total deviation was 7.83%). In order to find an equal protection violation it is
necessary to establish that either the deviation is such as to amount to invidious discrimination or that there is, in fact, invidious discrimination. See id. at 740-41.
44. See Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass. 1976); Ulland v. Growe,
262 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.) ("[Slome citizens may choose to vote irrationally, as is their
right .... "), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978).
45. Clough v. Guzzi, 416 F. Supp. 1057, 1067 (D. Mass. 1976). But cf. Comment, supra
note 3, at 841-42 (illegality of a government statutorily conferring preferential treatment
on a discriminatory basis is distinguishable from the voter's right to express whatever
personal biases that person holds).
46. See, e.g., Diamond v. Allison, 8 Cal. 3d 736, 737,-505 P.2d 205, 206, 106 Cal. Rptr.
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of voter behavior is often inconclusive and not always applicable to a
particular type of election.' 7 Presented with concrete evidence of a substantial impact on elections caused by positional bias, the court might
extend the greater protection of the strict scrutiny standard in reviewing
the statute.
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court did not apply the constitutional standards incorrectly, the current law affecting candidate name
placement on ballots is less than satisfactory. Election laws should eliminate as many uncertainties as possible that could cloud the intentions
of the voters."' In close elections particularly, a win or loss can be attributed to various intangible factors. Positional bias is but one of these
intangibles. A rule of name rotation for all types of elections could
eliminate positional bias as a factor in the election process. Furthermore, more than other methods, name rotation would affect at least the
appearance of fairness' no matter what the statistical evidence might
establish about the relative impact of positional bias on election results.
What ballot rotation does that no other method of name placement even
attempts to accomplish is to spread among all the candidates whatever
bias might occur; every method except name rotation allocates the benefits of whatever bias exists to a particular candidate.
In the past, Minnesota law has required ballot rotation in state legislative contests; 5° presently, rotation is required in all nonpartisan elec13, 14 (1973) (per curiam); Tsongas v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 708,
720-21, 291 N.E.2d 149, 156-57 (1972); Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 416 (Minn.),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927 (1978); cf. Gould v. Grubb, 14 Cal. 3d 661, 664, 536 P.2d 1337,
1338-39, 122 Cal. Rptr. 377, 378-79 (1975) (compelling governmental interest must be
shown to sustain validity of ballot placement statute where substantial advantage is
proven to inure to candidate occupying the top ballot position).
47. Ulland v. Growe, 262 N.W.2d 412, 414 & n.5 (Minn.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 927
(1978); cf. Sangmeister v. Woodard, 565 F.2d 460, 465-66 (7th Cir. 1977) (fact that advantage accrues to first position on ballot was supported by substantial evidence, even though
the conclusiveness and applicability of the data was disputed), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 989
(1978).
48. Minnesota law already seeks to establish as readable a ballot format as possible to
promote easy and accurate candidate selection by voters. See MINN. STAT. § 203A.12(1)

(1976).
49. See also United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973). In discussing limitations on federal employees' rights of political association, the United States Supreme Court not only expressed the strong concern that public
employees in the executive branch of government administer the law without bias for or
against any political party or group, id. at 564-65, but that the suggestion of prejudice
warrants prohibiting participation in certain political activities. The Court said: "[flt is
not only important that the Government and its employees in fact avoid practicing political justice, but it is also critical that they appear to the public to be avoiding it, if
confidence in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous
extent." Id. at 565. An appearance of corruption in the election process is "[olf almost
equal concern" as the danger of actual corrupt activities. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
27 (1976).

50. Prior to 1973, candidates for the state legislature were nominated on nonpartisan
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tions. Therefore, the tradition and the capability exist for the use of
name rotation.51 But, absent stronger evidence of the impact of positional bias, such a return to name rotation is not the responsibility of
the courts; it is the responsibility of the Minnesota Legislature. Surely
the Legislature will recognize that voters can identify their party's candidate through party labels, regardless of the position of the candidate's
name on the ballot. In an era when cynicism toward our political system
is widespread and has the potential to impair severely public participation in elections, the Legislature would do well to return to procedures
designed to enhance the integrity of the ballot election process.

Environmental Law-A BALANCING TEST ADOPTED UNDER
MERA-MPIRG v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762
(Minn. 1977).
An effort by the Minnesota Legislature in 1971 to protect, conserve,
and promote the best use of the state's natural resources resulted in the
passage of the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA).' MERA
ballots without designation of party affiliation beside the candidates' names. See Act of
Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. I, § 3(1), 1959 Minn. Laws 1133 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 203A.21(1) (1976)). First ballot position was, and continues to be, rotated in the
nonpartisan general election contests. See Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. IV, § 34(1),
1959 Minn. Laws 1158 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 203A.35(1) (1976)). In contrast to ballot
positioning of candidates in nonpartisan general elections, candidates in partisan general
elections were arranged in the order of number of votes polled by their party in the last
general election. In first position was the party polling the largest number of votes. See
Act of Apr. 24, 1959, ch. 675, art. IV, § 33(3) (current verson at MINN. STAT. § 203A.33(4)
(1976)). In 1973, ballot placement methods for state legislative contests changed when the
Legislature changed the status of elections for members of the state legislature from
nonpartisan to partisan. See Act of Feb. 20, 1973, ch. 3, § 1, 1973 Minn. Laws 2 (codified
at MINN. STAT. § 203A.21(1) (1976)).
51. Despite the expanded use of voting machines, which in some respects impairs the
ability to attain perfect name rotation, the use of the machines can be adapted to effect
rotation. See State v. Board of Comm'rs, 39 Ohio St. 2d 130, 135, 136-37 & n.4,314 N.E.2d
172, 176-78 & n.4 (1974). For a discussion of Ohio's method of achieving ballot rotation
while using voting machines, see the discussion of State v. Board of Comm'rs, supra note
9.
1. Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 952, 1971 Minn. Laws 2011 (codified at MINN. STAT. §§
116B.01-.13 (1976)). For a comprehensive discussion of the origin and legislative history
of the Act, see Note, The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 56 MINN. L. REV. 575
(1972). Discussion of actions brought under MERA in the first five years following its
enactment may be found in Bryden, Environmental Rights in Theory and Practice, 62
MINN. L. REv. 163 (1978).
The Legislature's policy under MERA is:
[T]o create and maintain within the state conditions under which man and
nature can exist in productive harmony in order that present and future genera-
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